If they don’t like it, we’ll turn off the gas. Why it is impossible to succumb to Moscow’s energy blackmail

05.09.2022, 22:57 newssky.com.ua

If they don’t like it, we’ll turn off the gas. Why it is impossible to succumb to Moscow’s energy blackmail And, if it is impossible to succumb to blackmail, then what should be done? Last Saturday, at the Leuseni checkpoint, Moldovan customs officers found in a minibus traveling from Russia, flags with Z and V symbols, prohibited in Moldova, and camouflage equipment with these symbols, images of tanks, and the Russian Nazi inscription “Strength is in Truth”. The cargo has been seized. The driver, who has dual citizenship of Moldova and Russia, and who was driving in Moldovan license plates in a roundabout way, bypassing Ukraine, entering Moldova from Romania, was detained and is giving evidence. On the same day, about 70,000 people protested in Prague, demanding the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions as damaging Czech businessmen, as well as stopping the weapons supply to Ukraine. What percentage of these 70 thousand were Russians permanently residing in the Czech Republic, the official news was silent. But, according to the Prague residents, there were about a third of Russian citizens with a Czech residence permit, and possibly more. Both episodes, different in significance and scale, are parts of the same picture. This is the beginning of another Moscow special operation to riot Europe in the winter. Moscow directly linked the volume of gas supplies to Europe and the prices for the supplied gas with the level of support for Ukraine. More support means less supply, and gas is more expensive. If you don’t want it, don’t take it: GAZPROM will burn excess gas on the border with Europe, and is already burning it, for about $300 million per month (according to Russian data). Or, if it can, it will sell gas, as well as oil, to China or India — in the volumes in which they still take it. Yes, it will sell them fossil fuels at a bargain price, but the European countries that help Ukraine repel Russian aggression will not get Russian gas. Once upon a time it might have worked. But Moscow’s problem today is that Europe, from a certain moment, has ceased to succumb to gas blackmail, at least at the level of most European politicians. Collective Europe, represented by EU members and candidates for membership, made a political decision to help Ukraine and establish an inviolable frontier between Russia and Europe along the 1991 Russian-Ukrainian border. But this requires efforts, primarily military ones. Russia’s solid borders stop only where it suffers a heavy military defeat, without any hope of revenge — and this is confirmed by the whole of Russia’s history. Now Russia, having lost the opportunity to influence European politicians directly, wants to influence them from below, through the ordinary European voter. To do this, Russians hope to freeze ordinary Europeans by organizing a shortage of gas and electricity, then upset them with high bills, artificially inflating gas prices, and, finally, pushing them to street protests, promising cheap gas in exchange for the surrender of Ukraine. And in order for this special operation to be successful, Russian agents are now conducting a preliminary buildup of the situation. They sow panic in connection with the allegedly impending energy catastrophe, prepare the organizing committees of future protests and deliver the necessary props for them. The protests that we see today in the Czech Republic and in Moldova are only rehearsals for the riot wave that Moscow wants to bring down on the streets of European cities this winter. It is the collapse, on the verge, or beyond the border of a humanitarian catastrophe, that is absolutely unrealistic in Europe. The European Union is well prepared even for a complete cessation of Russian gas supplies. Thanks to the partial diversification of supplies, gas storage facilities in the EU are already filled by about 80%, in Germany — by 85%. But energy prices have risen sharply nonetheless. Actually, Ukraine has offered its gas storage facilities (with their volume of 30 billion cubic meters) to the EU. And, precisely because of the rise in energy prices, the winter will not be catastrophic, but very difficult. Absolutely all prices are tied to energy, and, therefore, life in Europe will definitely become more expensive. Moreover, gas prices might grow only in Europe, since the average price of the volume of gas required for the production of 1 BTU (BTU, British thermal unit, approximately equal to 252 cal) in different world regions has recently fluctuated significantly. For North America it is $6.60, for East Asia it is $32.00, and for Europe it is $68.00. Such a huge gap in energy prices affects, among other things, affects European business, making it uncompetitive. Generally speaking, “average prices” are the “average body temperature in a hospital”. Prices under long-term contracts are usually lower than spot prices on the exchange, where free volumes of gas are sold “here and now”. But let’s not go into these details, but ask ourselves three questions: The gap in regional prices is due to logistics and politics. Gas, as you know, can be transported in two ways. Either through pipes, which is cheaper, but requires a permanent infrastructure that cannot be deployed from point to point. Or by gas carriers, in liquefied form, which is already more expensive, and which also requires a complex infrastructure: gas must be liquefied, loaded onto tankers, taken from them and fed again in the form of gas to the pipeline, otherwise delivered to the consumer by land gas carriers in liquid form. In any case, the supply of gas from one point to another, from a well to a consumer, is a very conservative thing. It is difficult to reconnect a consumer to a new gas source, or to connect a gas source to a new consumer. It is costly in terms of money, and it takes time, measured in years. Half a century ago, Europe, succumbing to the mirage of «peaceful coexistence», staked on Russian gas. In the 70s, it looked promising: relatively inexpensive and fairly reliable. It was more expensive to transport gas by tankers from the USA or from the Middle East, the situation in the USSR seemed stable and predictable, and there were no alternative fields discovered nearby. In principle, it was possible to buy gas from the USSR — why not? True, with a caveat: without increasing dependence on Moscow gas supplies to a critical level. But the Europeans ignored the advice of Ronald Reagan and forgot the history of their relationship with the Muscovites. Meanwhile, Russia has always sought to become a monopoly supplier of important raw materials, in order to, having received an exclusive position, then to induce the buyer to make political concessions. Over Russian salon conversations that “we will stop selling them” furs, wood or bread — and them in Europe, will die of cold or hunger, satirists chuckled back in the 19th century. In other words, the current situation could have been foreseen ten, twenty and thirty years ago. In the current situation, Russia has begun to use the European gas peg to cover up its military adventures: in Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia, Syria, Ukraine. For some time, Europe followed the Kremlin’s lead, its gas dependence was very strong and the price of abandoning it was high. And only after the start of the war in Ukraine, in 2014, Europe began to seriously think about diversifying supplies. However, the European geography, existing fields, pre-existing logistics and opportunities to build new routes all combined to keep Russian pipeline gas as the cheapest option. Naturally, in the event that gas prices were not artificially pumped up. The new logistics, passing through the territory of many states, required high costs, complex political decisions and large-scale security measures. And the Kremlin, using all possible levers, from local military conflicts to outright corruption of European politicians, sought to make it difficult to reduce European dependence on its gas supplies. In other words, the rejection of Russian gas was difficult. In addition, in Europe, there has been a great deal of wishful thinking, as for a long time the Europeans hoped that the Kremlin would come to its senses and stop the aggression, returning to peaceful business. This was obviously impossible because of the very nature of the Moscow regime, destructive and deeply hostile to the outer world. But the Europeans really wanted to believe in peaceful coexistence and profitable business with Moscow. Including those who, according to their position, were not supposed to believe that blindly, just “because they really wanted to”, but to think, analyze, study the essence of the problem and calculate options. In other words, the current price crisis is a direct consequence of a series of gross failures by European politicians and experts who fell for the Kremlin’s gas bait. With the beginning of the hot phase of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 22, Europe has accelerated the transition to non-Russian sources of gas supply, and on gas delivery routes that do not pass through Russia. This has become one of the ways to financially influence the Kremlin, in order to at least make it more difficult for him to wage war. In response, Russia began to artificially reduce gas supplies, doing it faster than the Europeans had time to build new logistics from alternative sources of gas supply. This is what caused the current surge in European prices. Will the price increase be permanent? In the medium term, no, it won’t. Over the past half century, many new gas fields have been discovered, with the possibility of creating convenient logistics. In the next 2–3 years, gas prices for Europeans may drop on a large scale. A steady decline will begin in the spring-summer of 2023. Thus, this winter of 2022–23 is the last chance for the Kremlin to carry out a successful gas blackmail. And, there is no doubt that the Kremlin will use this chance to the fullest. Anyone who has ever experienc